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The Health-Security Nexus and the European
Union: Toward a Research Agenda
Hylke DIJKSTRA and Anniek DE RUIJTER
Abstract
The European Union is increasingly moving toward an integrated policy approach, which
also acknowledges linkages between public health and (external) security policy. This
introduction to the Special Issue sets out a research agenda on the emerging health-security
nexus. It analyses recent policy developments with respect to the public health and security,
and discusses interactions along the health-security nexus in the context of the European
Union. It suggests drivers behind the integrated approach and it critically examines the
health-security nexus from the perspective of effectiveness and legitimacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognised that public health may affect security and vice versa.1 The
use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorists and enemy states presents a serious
security threat, which can put public health infrastructures under pressure.2 Pandemics
and epidemics – from the 1918 Inﬂuenza to HIV/AIDS and Ebola – can disrupt societies,
undermine development and cause conﬂict.3 Inter- and intra-state wars can cause
displacements, which in turn affect the provisions of humanitarian assistance and public
health.4 Pandemics are more likely to emerge in conﬂict zones where institutions are
weak.5 The human security paradigm and the notion of “freedom from want” dedicate a
central role to health security.6
1 George Rosen, A History of Public Health (John Hopkins University Press, 1958); F Fenner and others, Smallpox
and Its Eradication (World Health Organisation, 1988).
2 See e.g. UN Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their
Possible Use A/7575/Rev.1-S/9292/Rev.1 (New York, UN, 1969); World Health Organization, Report of a WHO
Group of Consultants on Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva, WHO, 1970).
3 See e.g. UN Security Council (17 July 2000) Resolution 1308.
4 UNHCR, (1951) The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/
3b66c2aa10.pdf>, Art. 23; MJ Toole and RJ Waldman, “Refugees and Displaced Persons. War, Hunger, and
Public Health” (1993) 270 JAMA 600; European Commission, Health: General Guidelines, Thematic Policy Document 7
(DG ECHO, February 2014), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ﬁles/policies/sectoral/health2014_general_health_
guidelines_en.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017); David P Fidler and Lawrence O Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age:
Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford University Press, 2007).
5 William J Long, Pandemics and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conﬂict (US Institute of Peace
Press, 2011).
6 Franklin D Roosevelt (6 January 1941) 1941 State of the Union Address “The Four Freedoms”, available at
<https://fdrlibrary.org/documents/356632/390886/readingcopy.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017); UN Development
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Traditionally, the EU has been a strong supporter of multilateral policies that address
security and public health concerns. It has supported non-proliferation regimes at least
since the early 1990s and has provided project funding to clean up nuclear stockpiles.7
Since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the EU has been building an external chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat capacity.8 The EU has also long
prided itself as the world’s principal development donor and as a keen supporter of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which encompassed a comprehensive
approach to issues of developments including health targets (MDG 4–6). As a result of
the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) crisis, public
health rose to the EU policy agenda resulting in a more comprehensive public health
model during the 1990s.9 The EU established the European Centre for Disease Control
(ECDC) in 2004 to address infectious diseases.10
While EU policies have largely developed in parallel (and continue to do so), in recent
years, we have witnessed an emerging nexus between public health and security policy.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the EU has adopted a series of sectoral policy
strategies that recognise the interaction between public health and security. The Lisbon
Treaty introduced an explicit link between public health and security policies,11 on
which basis the EU adopted the Decision on Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health in
2013 in an effort to “bridge the policy ﬁelds of health and security”.12 The EU Global
Strategy of June 2016, at the same time, calls for a truly “integrated approach” spanning
across policy areas and overcoming the internal-external dichotomy.
Although ofﬁcials in the international organisations, the EU and its member states are
increasingly focusing on the interaction between security and public health, academic
research continues to treat EU security policy and EU public health as two separate
domains of inquiry. With this Special Issue, we want to launch a new research agenda
(F'note continued)
Programme, Human Development Report (Oxford University Press, 1994). The threat of biological terrorism was also
invoked by Koﬁ Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, in his 2005 UN reform strategy, In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (United Nations, 2005), available at <http://www.
un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005>. In his view, “[o]ur best defence against this danger lies in
strengthening public health” and he seemed to indicate that he supported an expanded role for the Security Council in
the event of an “overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and security” (para. 93).
7 Camille Grand, “The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, Chaillot Paper 37 (Paris, EU
Institute for Security Studies, 2000).
8 Through a Centres of Excellence mechanism: <http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/>; see also Regulation (EC) No 1717/
2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 Establishing an Instrument for Stability,
[2006] OJ L 327).
9 Scott L Greer, “The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: Hub or Hollow Core?” (2012) 37 Journal
of Health Politics, Policy and Law 101; Tamara K Hervey and Jean V McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes
and Implications (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
10 M Liverani and R Coker, “Protecting Europe from Diseases: From the International Sanitary Conferences to
the ECDC” (2012) 37 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 913; Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 (ECDC),
Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 Establishing a European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, [2004] OJ L 142/1.
11 For instance, Art. 168 TFEU provides a (restricted) legal basis for the EU to legislate to combat “serious cross
border threats to health”. Art. 222 TFEU (Solidarity Clause) is much broader and notes that the “The Union and its
Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of
a natural or man-made disaster”.
12 Commission Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on Serious Cross-Border
Threats to Health Brussels (COM(2011)866 Final).
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regarding EU policy and law in public health and security. This introduction to the
Special Issue aims to take stock of the recent developments. In addition to providing an
overview of key policy developments, it outlines interactions along the health-security
nexus and it discusses the key drivers behind a more integrated approach. In the
conclusion, this introductory article focuses on the implications of an integrated
approach. It discusses implications for the efﬁciency and the legitimacy of policy-
making in this area.
II. TOWARD A HEALTH-SECURITY NEXUS IN EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
Despite a relatively long tradition in the World Health Organization (WHO) and United
Nations (UN) on establishing linkages between public health and security policy (and the
“freedom fromwant” discourse going back at least as far as the Four Freedoms speech of
Franklin D Roosevelt in 1941), it has taken a considerable time before a health-security
nexus started to emerge in the EU. This section ﬁrst analyses the emergence of public
health as an issue in the EU’s security strategies. It then turns to the identiﬁcation of
security threats in the EU’s public health documents. Finally, it focuses on the
contemporary developments as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009.
1. Public health as part of EU security policy
In the area of EU security policy, implications for domestic public health have not been
considered in a truly comprehensive way. This goes both for external and internal
security policies, which becomes clear when analysing the relevant security strategies.
With respect to the external security strategies – particularly the European Security
Strategy (2003),13 the Implementation Report of the European Security Strategy
(2008)14 and the EU Global Strategy (2016)15 – public health concerns are mostly a
development/humanitarian problem: something for other countries to worry about. The
European Security Strategy, for instance, notes that “AIDS is now one of the most
devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of
societies”.16 Similarly, the 2008 Implementation Report puts pandemics explicitly
under the security-development nexus: “Threats to public health, particularly pandemics,
further undermine development”.17
13 European Council, A Security Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (12 December, 2003),
available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017).
14 Javier Solana, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing
World, S407/08 (11 December 2008), available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/reports/104630.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017).
15 EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign
and Security Policy (June 2016), available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.
pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017).
16 European Council (2013) p. 2. But see Stefan Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of
Linking HIV/AIDS and Security” (2006) 50 International Studies Quarterly 119; JM Mann and D Tarantola,
“Responding to HIV/AIDS: A Historical Perspective” (1998) 2 Health and Human Rights: an International Quarterly
Journal 5; Colin Mcinnes and Simon Rushton, “HIV, AIDS and Security: Where Are We Now?” (2010) 86
International Affairs 225; Simon Rushton, “AIDS and International Security in the United Nations System” (2010) 25
Health Policy and Planning 495; also see Community Programme of Research into Aids [1984] OJ C 46.
17 Solana, supra, note 14, p. 18.
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The European Security Strategy acknowledges a (limited) domestic element by stating
that “New diseases can spread rapidly [in conﬂict areas] and become global threats”.18
The recent EU Global Strategy is more explicit and it aims to strengthen global
governance in this regard: “On health, we will work for more effective prevention,
detection and responses to global pandemics”.19 Yet with respect to CBRN in particular,
the link to health issues is nearly absent. This is rather surprising, as particularly the
European Security Strategy puts weapons of mass destruction (WMD) up-front-and-
centre. Of all the external security strategies, only the 2008 Implementation Report
considers the issue indirectly by stressing “Within the EU, we have done much to protect
our societies against terrorism ... on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis
Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism”.20
The implications of external security threats for public health thus seem obvious, but
they are ultimately not addressed. We witness the same phenomenon in the internal
security policies of the EU. The EU Counterterrorism Strategy of 2005,21 which was
adopted after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), and which
continues to guide European policies, presents a key example in this respect. It outlines a
comprehensive approach to combat terrorism by proposing concrete measures that the
EU and its member states can take. These are labelled under “prevent”, “protect”,
“pursue” and “respond”. At ﬁrst instance, the strategy seems to make clear links with
public health implications of terrorism. The protect pillar, for instance, focuses on
citizens as well as infrastructure and has as its aim to reduce vulnerabilities. The respond
pillar notes explicitly the “needs of victims”.22
Yet when reading the strategy in greater detail, it becomes clear that these issues have
been deﬁned in minimalist terms. The EU has not gone the extra mile discussing public
health implications. The protect pillar is about critical infrastructures and transport (not
surprising in the aftermath of the Madrid and London attacks).23 A key initiative is, for
instance, the passenger name record.24 With respect to the respond pillar, the strategy
notes that the response to terrorist attacks is often similar to natural and man-made
disasters (echoing Article 222 TFEU) and that similar mechanisms may be used. Health
is not explicitly mentioned. The needs of victims focus on “solidarity, assistance and
compensation”,25 including for families, rather than cure and care.
This concise analysis of the key external and internal security strategies therefore
shows that while there are some references to public health, connections between
security policy and public health remain indirect. It is explicitly made clear that public
health is part of the security-development nexus, but this applies largely to other
18 Supra, note 13, p. 2.
19 EEAS, supra, note 15, p. 43.
20 Solana, supra, note 14, p. 4.
21 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 14469/4/05 (30 November
2005), available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>
(accessed 26 July 2017).
22 ibid., p. 3.
23 ibid., paras. 14–21.
24 EU ﬁght against terrorism (16 December 2016), Website of the Council of the European Union, available at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ﬁght-against-terrorism/> (accessed 26 July 2017).
25 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, supra, note 21, para. 36.
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countries. Furthermore, despite the comprehensive nature of EU counter-terrorism
policies and the obvious links to public health, the EU has so far refrained from making
connections explicit.
2. Security as part of EU public health
The EU has a public health programme that addresses various issues, including many
that are not directly linked to security threats, such as obesity or mental health
programmes.26 At the same time, however, in several EU public health policies, security
is more explicitly entering the mechanisms, laws and institutions.27 Article 168 TFEU
outlines the role of the EU in human health. Although harmonisation of public health law
is excluded,28 there are several speciﬁc areas where the EU can harmonise national laws.
On health security the EU needs to “complement national policies”. This covers, inter
alia, “monitoring, early warning and combating serious cross-border threats to health”.
By way of the ordinary legislative procedure the EU institutions may also adopt, in this
regard, “incentive measures”.29
In terms of secondary EU law the scope for deﬁning a “threat to health” is relatively
broad. In 2013, the EU adopted a new legal instrument, the Decision on Serious Cross-
Border Threats to Health (“Health Threats Decision”) to regulate EU involvement in the
response to public health threats, chemical attacks and bioterrorism.30 This Decision is
an all-encompassing regulatory instrument, covering not only known, but also unknown
health risks. It is a European effort to, in the words of the European Commission, “bridge
the policy ﬁelds of health and security”.31 Importantly this Decision also covers health
threats that may come from the access of non-state actors to CBRN materials. CBRN, in
this respect, serves as a link between the ﬁelds of security and public health. In the EU, a
CBRN Action Plan was adopted in 2010 alongside a Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, which aims to limit
unauthorised access to CBRN materials and improve member states’ capacity to prevent
and detect CBRN incidents.32
Hence, whereas the regulatory approach of the EU in the late-1990s kept security out
of the public health coordination and regulation, with the 2013 Decision, security
aspects, such as the deliberate release of biochemical toxins became part of the existing
26 Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 of 11 March 2014 on the Establishment of a Third Programme for the Union’s
Action in the Field of Health (2014–2020).
27 Marise Cremona, “The EU and Global Emergencies: Competence and Instruments” in Antonis Antoniadis, Robert
Schütze and Eleanor Spaventa (eds), The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law and Policy Analysis (Hart
Publishing, 2011) 27.
28 Art. 168(5) TFEU.
29 It is unclear what “incentive measures” are exactly; see further also Art. 168(5) TFEU, which excludes any
harmonisation measures of member states’ laws.
30 See Decision No 1082/2013/EU, supra, note 12; Anniek de Ruijter, “The Role of the EU in Responding to Major
Health Threats: The Co-Production of EU Expert and Executive Power” in Maria Weimer and Anniek de Ruijter (eds),
The Co-Production of EU Expert and Executive Power in the Field of Public Health and the Environment (Hart
Publishing, 2016).
31 Commission Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on Serious Cross-Border
Threats to Health Brussels (COM(2011)866 Final).
32 See Ralf Trapp, “The EU’S CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative after six years” SIPRI EU Non-proliferation
Paper No 55 (February 2017).
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health disease mechanisms.33 Within these mechanisms the EU can coordinate and
exchange personal records, commence contact tracing and coordinate member states’
responses to “health threats” generally, which includes e.g. bioterrorist attacks.34
Furthermore, with the establishment of the Health Security Committee and its
strengthening in 2013, the EU has put in place a permanent internal coordinating
mechanism to respond and act in case of an emerging threat.35
The analysis of both primary and secondary legal instruments and EU public health
policies shows that security has made inroads into public health policy. This is much
more explicit than, as noted above, the consideration of public health in the various
security strategies. The EU has established and nominated special institutional actors to
work on security within public health, such as the Health Security Committee.
Furthermore, the public health information systems and mechanisms are now also used
for security purposes. Hence within the policy ﬁeld of public health there is an
increasingly explicit link with security.
3. The internal-external security nexus after the Lisbon Treaty
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has resulted in several changes in the overall
architecture of combating health-related security risks. A number of provisions were
added which give the EU a basis for responding to emergencies. Article 214 TFEU
outlines the role of the EU in external action particularly regarding humanitarian aid in
third countries. It allows the EU to respond and provide ad hoc relief in natural or man-
made emergencies in third countries. In addition, the new Article 222 TFEU addresses
internal challenges. It provides for solidarity between member states in case of a natural
or man-made disaster and/or a terrorist attack. This action is to be coordinated by the EU
institutions. Article 196 TFEU furthermore provides for civil protection, both internally
and externally. These three new Treaty articles complement the strengthening of the
health-security nexus of Article 168 TFEU, as outlined above.
On the basis of the “health threats” paragraph in Article 168 TFEU, the above-
discussed Health Threats Decision was adopted. It regulates the coordination of member
states’ action in responding to “major health threats”. The Decision encompasses the
existing communicable disease control network. The Decision extends the Early
Warning and Response System (EWRS),36 which is operated by the ECDC, from only
several speciﬁc communicable diseases to all health threats.37 Chemical, biological
and radio-nuclear threats, particularly when it involves the risk of deliberate release
33 Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 Setting up a
Network for the Epidemiological Surveillance and Control of Communicable Diseases in the Community [1998] OJ L
268/1); Commission Decision (2000/57/EC) of 22 December 1999 on the Early Warning and Response System for the
Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases under Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council [2000] OJ L 21, p. 32.
34 ibid. And see European Commission, Statements of Health Security Committee and Early Warning and Response
System, MEMO/09/362 (13 August 2009).
35 Decision No 1082/2013/EU, supra, note 12.
36 Commission Decision (2000/57/EC) of 22 December 1999 on the Early Warning and Response System for the
Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases under Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council [2000] OJ L 21, p. 32.
37 Decision No 1082/2013/EU, supra, note 12, at para 16.
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(bioterrorism or bio-chemical warfare), are currently all subsumed into one legislative
and institutional framework. In this decision, naturally occurring disease (public health)
and threats to security are merged as its deﬁnition of a “serious cross-border threat to
health”, in Article 3(g), reads as a
… life threatening or otherwise serious hazard to health of biological, chemical
environmental or unknown origin which spreads or entails a signiﬁcant risk of spreading
across the national borders of Member States, and which may necessitate coordination at
Union level in order to ensure a high level of human health protection.
Furthermore, the coordinating structures created by the Health Threats Decision:
[S]hould, in exceptional circumstances, be available to the Member States and to the
Commission when the threat is not covered by this Decision and where it is possible that
public health measures taken to counter that threat are insufﬁcient to ensure a high level of
protection of human health.38
Hence, the Decision creates a wide scope as it brings a number of new security related
(CBRN threats) aspects into the fold of older systems for information exchange,
surveillance and preparedness.39 Operationally, the EU has created a European Medical
Corps in 2016 in order to help medical teams and public health teams and equipment
within and outside the EU. The Medical Corps can make medical teams and assets
available already before a health security threat evolves. The corps can deploy medical
teams, public health coordination teams, mobile biosafety laboratories and medical
evacuation planes. The recent Ebola outbreak spurred on setting up this “white helmets”
initiative. The Commission, through the Emergency Response Capacity, managed the
initiative. The Medical Corps also works together with the WHO Global Health
Emergency Workforce and it is part of the European Civil Protection Mechanism.40
Hence, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, interactions along the internal-external
security nexus in the EU have comemore prominent. As a result of secondary EU law we
witness an increasing blurring of lines, also with respect to the policy silos of public
health and security.41 Diseases can be considered a threat to security because they may
be deliberately released or because of the fast speed that pathogens travel in a globalised
world. Security threats may have speciﬁc public health implications and challenge
critical infrastructures in this regard.
III. DRIVERS BEHIND THE INTEGRATED APPROACH
While we cannot yet speak of a fully comprehensive health-security nexus in the EU, we
clearly see a development towards a more integrated approach. At this point it is worth
moving away from describing these policy developments toward offering explanations.
Essentially, we can identify four drivers behind a more integrated approach. These
38 ibid., at para. 9.
39 Anniek de Ruijter, “Mixing EU Security and Public Health in the Health Threats Decision” in Anniek de Ruijter and
Maria Weimer (eds), EU Risk Regulation, Expert and Executive Power (Hart Publishing, 2017).
40 European Commission Press Release, “EU Launches New European Medical Corps to Respond Faster to
Emergencies” (MEMO/16/276).
41 Fidler and Gostin, supra, note 4.
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drivers are not mutually exclusive and complement each other. Our purpose is not to
provide one answer, but rather to bring the debate to a conceptual level.
1. Systemic risks and management strategies
It is regularly argued that the world has grown more complex in recent decades due to
processes of globalisation and technological innovation.42 Complexity, in this regard, is
characterised by the fact that we can no longer easily relate cause to effect. It is one of
several factors behind what have been called “systemic risks”.43 Contrary to “simple
risks”, which are addressed in banking and insurance of a daily basis, systemic risks
cannot be captured in probabilistic formulas. What is more, systemic risks often involve
“interdependencies and ripple and spillover effects that initiate impact cascades between
otherwise unrelated risk clusters”.44
An understanding of systemic risks is signiﬁcant, as it presents a clear driver for the
integrated approach proposed by the EU in the Global Strategy.45 Traditional divides,
such as the one behind internal and external security, are no longer sustainable once
European nationals pack their bags to ﬁght for ISIS in Syria, and occasionally return for
terrorist attacks. Equally there is an increasing recognition that health is part of the wider
development-security nexus, that natural diseases do not stop at Europe’s borders, and
that attacks with chemical and biological weapons by enemy states and combatants affect
public health. Security and public health are no longer separate public goods
(or problems that can be contained separately) and the emphasis is on joined-up policy.
While greater coordination and policy integration are lofty aims, the tragedy of
systemic risks is that they cannot be really solved. When it comes to systemic risks,
the objective is risk acceptance and management and mitigation instead of risk
elimination.46 This involves making societies and policies more robust and resilient
against unpredictable risks and the unpredictable impact of risks.47 While the EU
Global Strategy puts signiﬁcant emphasis on the resilience of states and societies in the
“east and south”,48 it pays no attention to its own resilience by the EU as an international
42 See e.g. Carl Folke, Johan Colding and Fikret Berkes, “Synthesis: building resilience and adaptive capacity in
social-ecological systems” in Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding and Carl Folke (eds), Navigating Social-ecological Systems:
Building Resilience for Complexity and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003); John Urry, “The complexity turn”
(2005) 22 Theory Culture and Society 1; Marc Welsh, “Resilience and responsibility: governing uncertainty in a
complex world” (2014) 180 The Geographical Journal 15.
43 Ortwin Renn, Andreas Klinke and Marjolein van Asselt, “Coping with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in
risk governance: a synthesis” (2011) 40 Ambio 231.
44 ibid.; T Hellstroem, Emerging Technological and Systemic Risk: Three Cases with Management Suggestions.
Contribution to the OECD International Futures Project on Emerging Systemic Risks (OECD, 2001).
45 On an analysis of the EU Global Strategy, see Hylke Dijkstra, “Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers for the EU
Global Strategy” (2016) 37 Contemporary Security Policy 369. For critical perspectives, see David Chandler, “The
security-development nexus and the rise of ‘anti-foreign policy’” (2007) 10 Journal of International Relations and
Development 362; Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, “Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conﬂict, Complexity,
Cacophony, Convergence?” (2010) 41 Security Dialogue 5; Mark Dufﬁeld, “The Liberal Way of Development and the
Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide” (2010) 41 Security Dialogue 53.
46 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage 1986/1992).
47 IRGC, White Paper on Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach. (International Risk Governance
Council, 2005); Otwinn Renn, Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World (Earthscan, 2008).
48 EEAS, supra, note 15, pp. 23–28; Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt, “Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s
new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?” (2016) 37 Contemporary Security Policy 414; Ana E Juncos,
“Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?” (2017) 26 European Security 1.
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actor.49 The integrated approach is a recognition of the changing environment, but
systemic risks equally demand an increased degree of ﬂexibility of the EU itself to cope
with the unexpected.
2. Reactive events-driven policy-making
Another key driver behind the increasing integrated approach in the EU is the focus on
governing yesterday’s risks and problems. International institutions, like all political
institutions, tend to be relatively stable, status quo prone and path dependent.50 Change
comes about from highly salient events and the path chosen at those key critical junctions
is often a response to the crisis of the day.51 The most obvious example is the European
Security Strategy of 2003, which was an attempt to heal the wounds of a strongly divided
membership over the US intervention in Iraq earlier that year. As the “most frightening
scenario”, the European Security Strategy sketches the possibility that weapons of mass
destruction fall in the hands of terrorists.52 It is difﬁcult to understand such language
outside the context of 9/11, the hunt for Saddam’s nuclear weapons and the talked up
synergies between Iraq and Al-Qaeda.
Examples of a reactive policy approach are omnipresent in both EU security policy and
public health. It is well-documented how EU terrorism policy was established through the
European counterterrorism strategy of 2005 following theMadrid and London bombings in
2004 and 2005.53 Similarly, in the ﬁeld of public health and food safety, we have witnessed
extensive regulation after the BSE crisis from 1996. In line with the security environment
after 9/11, and particularly after the attack of anthrax after 9/11, where anthrax was sent by
letters through the US mail, the public health model changed. The idea was that similar to
military readiness the “armaments of public health” would need to be prepared for terrorist
attacks.54 But also the setting up a European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) and the ECDC
can be traced back as reactions to food scares and disease outbreaks with an EU-wide
reach.55 The international scares of SARS, bird ﬂu and swine ﬂu were pivotal drivers in
creating momentum at EU level for adopting a number of legislative changes.56
49 It brieﬂy notes resilience of critical infrastructures, particularly in the context of cyber security, and the ambiguous
“resilience of its democracies”.
50 James G March and Johan P Olsen, “The institutional dynamics of international political orders” (1998) 52
International Organization 943; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton
University Press, 2004); Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
51 SL Greer, “Choosing Paths in European Union Health Policy: A Political Analysis of a Critical Juncture” (2008) 18
Journal of European Social Policy 219.
52 Supra, note 13, p. 4; and see European Commission, “European Commission, Programme of Cooperation on
Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Health Security)” Luxembourg, 17 December
2001 (G/FS D(2001) GG).
53 Rik Coolsaet, “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera?” (2010) 86 International Affairs 857;
Raphael Bossong, The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European Security Policy After 9/11 (Routledge, 2013);
Raphael Bossong, “The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed Instrument of EU Security Governance”
(2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 27.
54 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, supra, note 21.
55 Christopher K Ansell and David Vogel, What’s the Beef?: The Contested Governance of European Food Safety
(MIT Press, 2006) 263 et sqq; Liverani and Coker, supra, note 10; Greer, supra, note 9.
56 Anniek de Ruijter, The Expansion of EU Power in the Field of Human Health (forthcoming Oxford University
Press, 2017).
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Precisely because many of the contemporary crises and risks have important cross-
policy effects, as noted above under systemic risks, it is not surprising that responses to
previous salient events put an emphasis on an integrated approach. The Madrid and
London bombings were transport related, as was 9/11, the March 2016 Brussels attacks,
but also the shooting in the 2015 Thalys train. This has resulted in the EU putting a lot of
emphasis on transport security and particularly cross-border vulnerabilities. It is also
obvious that transport and the cross-border implication potentially give the EU more
competence, which connects to the next driver for an integrated approach. Dynamics
along the health-security nexus may be similar.
3. EU-level entrepreneurship
Closely related to the previous two drivers is the central role that EU-level actors have in
pushing their agendas forward.57 EU-level actors tend to thrive when they operate in
between the deﬁned lines. In grey areas, and unexplored territory, they can propose courses
of action that do not immediately conﬂict with the predeﬁned preferences of themembership.
What is more, due to their central position in policy networks,58 they are typically in a unique
position to act when “windows of opportunity” present themselves.59 Indeed, international
bureaucrats tend to be particularly strong when it comes to “overlap management”.60
The examples of entrepreneurship by EU actors have been well-rehearsed in the academic
literature.61What is worth stating is that EU actors may have a strong interest in the integrated
approach and the health-security nexus: defence, homeland security and public health are
national-level policies par excellence, monopolised by the nation-state. It is precisely when
an innovative label can be put on approach (such as the invention of crisis management in the
area of external security), or when a cross-border element can be identiﬁed (such as the
argument that diseases and biological weapons do not stop at borders), that the EU can pursue
competence and expand its remit of activities. A key example is the European Security
Strategy, which puts an explicit emphasis on “new threats” before boldly stating that “[t]he
European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations”.62
4. Securitisation across policy areas
Finally, continuing on the previous point, the securitisation literature has made it clear
that certain actors for their political interests may seek to “securitise” a policy in order to
57 Brigid Laffan, “From policy entrepreneur to policy manager: the challenge facing the European Commission”
(1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 422; Claudio M Radaelli, “The public policy of the European Union:
whither politics of expertise?” (1999) 6 Journal of European Public Policy 757; Alisdair Young “The European Policy
Process in Comparative Perspective” in Helen Wallace, Mark Pollack and Alisdair Young (eds), Policy-Making in the
European Union, 7th edn (Oxford University Press, 2015).
58 John Peterson, “Decision-making in the European Union: Towards a framework for analysis” (1995) 2 Journal of
European Public Policy 69.
59 John W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Little, Brown, 1984).
60 Sikina Jinnah, Post-Treaty Politics: Secretariat Inﬂuence in Global Environmental Governance (MIT Press, 2014).
61 Jonas Tallberg, “The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency” (2003) 10 Journal of European Public
Policy 1; Christian Kaunert, European Internal Security – Towards Supranational Governance in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice? (Manchester University Press, 2011). Hylke Dijkstra, “Agenda-setting in the Common Security
and Defence Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective” (2012) 47 Cooperation and Conﬂict 454; Hylke Dijkstra, Policy-
making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
62 Supra, note 13, p.7.
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affect policy outcomes.63 When the label of security is put over a policy area, it
empowers a typically different set of actors. This can be a particular concern in the area
of public health, where, at global level there is ample research on the manner in
which securitisation may take place.64 The Copenhagen School has suggested that there
is a clear rational-actor process by which securitisation can be identiﬁed.65 In the ﬁrst
phase an actor identiﬁes an existential threat to security through declaring the
threat as such in a “speech act”. The second phase concerns the acceptance by the
target audience that a certain threat to security is existential. In the third phase emergency
measures are assumed, whereby policy and budget is allocated in order to combat
the threat.66
Securitisation is well researched and established with regard to the analysis of global
health policy.67 However, with regard to the EU public health-security nexus, although
there are strong indicators that securitisation can be an explanatory factor for recent
policy changes, research has been lagging. Analysing the possible different drivers in the
increasing nexus between EU public health shows that there are multiple possible
dynamics at work. Besides offering explanations and understanding what is happening,
it is important to bring into play the possible implications and trade-offs of the public-
health security nexus in the EU.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS
In this introductory article, we have discussed the emergence of a health-security nexus
in the EU. We have traced this development through ofﬁcial policies and discussed
interactions along the health-security nexus. We have also outlined a number of drivers
behind an increasing integrated approach to public health and (external) security. In this
conclusion, we critically reﬂect on these developments and raise a number of concerns
from the standpoint of effectiveness and legitimacy.
In the policy discourses, the integrated approach is often presented in terms of
effectiveness.68 It is generally assumed that coordination and collaboration results in
a more coherent EU approach to contemporary problems. Yet a key question for
effectiveness remains whether there is any more to the integrated approach than solely
coordination. A truly integrated approach involves a reallocation of competences, the
63 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1998).
64 Alexander Kelle, “Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health Governance and the
Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime” (2007) 13 Global Governance 217; Elbe, supra, note 16; Stefan Elbe,
“Haggling over Viruses: The Downside Risks of Securitizing Infectious Disease” (2010) 25Health Policy and Planning
476; Fidler and Gostin, supra, note 4; T Murphy and N Whitty, “Is Human Rights Prepared? Risks, Rights and Public
Health Emergencies” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 219.
65 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, supra, note 64; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International
Security Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
66 But see Elbe, supra, note 64; Catherine Lo Yuk-ping and Nicholas Thomas, “How Is Health a Security Issue?
Politics, Responses and Issues” (2010) 25Health Policy and Planning 447; David Fidler, “A Pathology of Public Health
Securitism: Approaching Pandemics as Security Threats” in Andrew Cooper (ed.), Governing Global Health:
Challenge, Response, Innovation (Routledge, 2016).
67 But see Fidler and Gostin, supra, note 4.
68 See e.g. EEAS, supra, note 15, pp. 28–29.
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breaking down of barriers, and adequate resourcing. One also wonders whether this is
desirable. For instance, the dichotomy between external and internal security exists for
very good reasons and we may not want to break down the existing constitutional and
legal order. If an integrated approach does not go further than coordination, one wonders
whether it does not raise unrealistic expectations.
One can also ask questions as to what implications a security-health nexus has for the
assignment of of resources.69 On the one hand the proﬁle of public health may be raised
due to the linkages between health and security, which may in turn result in more
resources assigned to public health. More funding for public hospitals’ surge capacity,
for instance, may become possible as the infrastructure for preparedness get higher on
the policy agenda. On the other hand, the focus on possible health security threats may
lead to a more short-term focus on policy, particular also with regard to external-
development public health priorities, and take attention off ongoing and more durable
public health prevention programmes that that may be more deserving in terms of
morbidity and mortality.70
Apart from questions over effectiveness, we see a number of possible trade-offs with
respect to legitimacy. In the ﬁeld of public health there is a long-standing discussion
about balancing public health and individual rights. Indeed, choices regarding
quarantines or mandatory vaccinations have long been part and parcel of public
health.71 The HIV/AIDS pandemic showed that when disease becomes part of a different
paradigm – in the late 1980s HIV/AIDS discussions revolved around the criminalisation
of disease carriers as different members (criminals) of society – the effects can lead to
serious fundamental right infringements.72 In a study on the SARS outbreak and the uses
of quarantines in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Toronto, the more extensive use of
quarantines in Toronto was attributed to the different consciousness with regard to the
nature of the risk that was involved.73 In the framework of security, health threats
are a rational risk that can be assessed and established by scientiﬁc experts.74
Fundamental rights, instead, are part of a value-based legal framework. The question is
whether these different balances are on an even par in terms of both in- and output of
EU policy and law.75
Another possible trade-off concerns the central role of civil society in public health
versus the state-run monopoly on security matters and the use of force. These may be
69 Mark Flear, Governing Public Health: EU Law, Regulation and Biopolitics (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).
70 Murphy and Whitty, supra, note 64; S Mounier-Jack and RJ Coker, “How Prepared Is Europe for Pandemic
Inﬂuenza? Analysis of National Plans” (2006) 367 Lancet 1405.
71 See Rosen, supra, note 1.
72 E Cameron “Criminalization of HIV Transmission: Poor Public Health Policy” (2009) 14 HIV/AIDS Policy & Law
Review 1; Miriam Maluwa, Peter Aggleton and Richard Parker, “HIV- and AIDS-Related Stigma, Discrimination, and
Human Rights: A Critical Overview” (2002) 6 Health and Human Rights 1; Lance Gable, Lawrence O Gostin and
James G Hodge, “HIV/AIDS, Reproductive and Sexual Health, and the Law” (2008) 98 American Journal of Public
Health 1779.
73 See LA Jacobs, “Rights and Quarantine during the SARS Global Health Crisis: Differentiated Legal Consciousness
in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Toronto” (2007) 41 Law and Society Review 51, and see further discussion in Murphy and
Whitty, supra, note 64.
74 See de Ruijter, supra note 39.
75 Murphy andWhitty, supra, note 64; Flear, supra, note 69. See also RMartin, “The Exercise of Public Health Powers
in Cases of Infectious Disease: Human Rights Implications” (2006) 14 Med LR 132.
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difﬁcult to reconcile with all the signiﬁcant consequences. For instance, while openness
and transparency are relevant in public health, security matters are often covered by a
cloak of secrecy. Finding middle ground, in such respects, will likely be sub-optimal
from both perspectives. These fundamental trade-offs both in terms of effectiveness and
legitimacy currently receive insufﬁcient attention in all the talk and increasing practice of
an integrated approach. This makes further academic research on the emerging health-
security nexus and the EU all the more relevant.
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